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gence suits by a woman against her husband have been allowed," the statutes giving
married women the right to sue in their own names have been the basis of recovery,
the courts saying that the disability to sue their husbands has been removed by im-
plication. Characteristically, conceptual jurisprudence has provided an inroad and
recovery has been allowed against the employers of a negligent person who was a
member of the family of the plaintiff although the same courts would have denied
recovery against the employee directly.- Other manifestations of this approach are
not wanting. A suit by the administrator of the estate of a daughter negligently killed
by her father was not considered a suit by the mother against her husband, although
the administrator brought suit for her benefit,3 and a father was allowed to recover
from his daughter's husband for her wrongful death, regardless of the fact that the
daughter could not have recovered for her injuries had she survived.'4
On principle there appears to be no reason for not allowing members of the family
group recourse to the courts for an orderly adjudication of their claims against each
other. But it must also be remembered that resort to the courts is infrequent unless an
insurance company is involved and precaution should be taken to protect the insurer
against collusion and other kinds of fraud as well as against liability for a risk which
it has not assumed by the policy.
Injunctions-Possibility of Clarification by Declaratory Judgment-[Federal].-
The plaintiff in a suit for unfair competition obtained a final decree restraining the
defendant from the use of a trade name and from selling its product in a form similar
to the plaintiff's. Thereafter the defendant filed a supplementary petition in the same
court requesting a determination as to whether its recently initiated plan for market-
ing its product would violate the injunction. Held, in denying the petition, that such
a procedure is contrary to the settled practice in the district and circuit and, moreover,
calls upon the court to render an advisory opinion. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.'
"1 Wait v. Pierce, 1g1 Wis. 202, 2o9 N.W. 475 (1926); Rains v. Rains, 97 Colo. 19, 46 P"
(2d) 740 (x935); Miltimore v. Milford Motor Co., 197 Atl. 330 (N.H. 1938).
1 Schubert v. August Schubert Wagon Co., 249 N.Y. 253, 164 N.E. 42 (1928); Koontz v.
Messer, 320 Pa. 487, x8i AUt. 792 (i935); Pittsley v. David, ii N.E. (2d) 461 (Mass. i937).
13 Albrecht v. Potthoff, 192 Minn. 557, 257 N.W. 377 (1934).
'4 Kaczorowski v. Kalkosinski, 321 Pa. 438, 184 Atl. 663 (1936). The court here said that
as the derivation of the action was the tortious act itself, it came to the parties, entitled by
statute to sue, free from the personal disabilities arising from the relationship between the
deceased and the wrongdoer.
'22 F. Supp. 8oi (Del. 1938). This case has become moot because the Supreme Court
recently decided that the Kellogg Co. was not guilty of unfair competition. For the history of
the litigation see National Biscuit Co. v. Kellogg Co., 9i F. (2d) i5o (C.C.A. 3d 1937) injunc-
tion granted, cert. denied, 302 U.S. 733 (1937). On January 5, 1938, the district court issued a
permanent injunction pursuant to the order of the circuit court of appeals. The petition in the
instant case was presented on January 20, 1938. Subsequently, the defendant, Kellogg Co.,
petitioned the circuit court of appeals for a recall of its mandate ordering the injunction to be
issued "for purposes of clarification." National Biscuit Co. v. Kellogg Co., 96 F. (2d) 873
(C.C.A. 3d 1938). On reconsideration the Supreme Court granted certiorari, 58 S. Ct. 1052
(1938), and reversed, Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 59 S. Ct. 109 (1938), rehearing
denied, 59 S. Ct. 246 (1938). For a case in accord with the Supreme Court decision see Ca-
nadian Shredded Wheat Co. v. Kellogg Co., [1938] 2 D.L.R. 145.
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It has been said that equitable decrees should be so formulated as to give adequate
protection to the plaintiff against further injury and reasonably to apprise the de-
fendant as to what he is required to do. While these requirements are easily met
where the relief granted demands performance of a single definite act,3 a court's
decree must necessarily be couched in general terms, where the limits of the wrong
are ambiguous and ill-defined. In such cases courts have held that a person acting in
good faith is not guilty of contempt if placed in a dilemma by an ambiguous order of
the court. 4 Furthermore, courts have, on occasion, ordered injunctions modified be-
cause too favorably disposed to the plaintiff,s or have dissolved injunctions because
of their vagueness.
6
As a partial remedy for the aforementioned difficulties a decree may embody cer-
tain specific provisions either as to what the defendant may do to avoid violation of
the decree7 or what he must do to comply with it;8 and courts have at times issued so-
called experimental decrees whereby the defendant is allowed a probationary period
in which to remedy the wrong in question.9 A more common procedure is to issue
a decree and to retain jurisdiction to modify it if within a certain time such a decree
prove unsatisfactory to either party.'0 The second and sixth circuits have adopted an
interesting practice, not accepted by the court in the instant case, ' - which has been
Collins v. Wayne Iron Works, 227 Pa. 326, 76 Atl. 24 (I9Ia).
3 See for example Rothery v. New York Rubber Co., go N.Y. 30 (1882).
4 N.L.R.B. v. Bell Oil and Gas. Co., o8 F. (2d) 405 (C.C.A. 5th 1938). See also In re Miller
& Harbough, 54 F. (2d) 612 (C.C.A. 9th i93i); Home Title Ins. Co. v. Britten Bldg. Corp.,
227 App. Div. 631, 236 N.Y. Supp. 35 (1929); Mitchell v. Sperling, 229 App. Div. 204, 241
N.Y. Supp. 543 (I93O); State v. Bailey, 132 Ore. 350, 285 Pac. 809 (1930).
s Wisconsin Electric Co. v. Dunmore Co., 35 F. (2d) 555 (C.C.A. 6th 1929), cerl. granted,
281 U.S. 710 (i93o), dismissed 282 U.S. 813 (ig3i).
6 R. E. Hicks Corporation v. National Salesman's Training Ass'n, Inc., 19 F. (2d) 963
(C.C.A. 7 th 1927); L. H. Henry and Sons v. Rhinesmith, 219 Iowa io88, 26o N.W. 9 (I935).
On nebulous injunctions see ig Mich. L. Rev. 83 (i92o); 23 Mich. L. Rev. 53 (1924).
7 Walter Baker and Co., Ltd. v. Baker, 87 Fed. 209 (C.C. N.Y. i898).
8 G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Ogilvie, 170 Fed. 167 (C.C.A. 1st igog); L. E. Waterman Co.
v. Modem Pen Co., 197 Fed. 534 (C.C.A. 2d 1912); G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, ig
Fed. 369 (C.C.A. 6th 1912); Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey-Cornell Co., 250 Fed. 96o
(C.C.A. 2d i918); Coty, Inc. v. Prestonettes, Inc., 3 F. (2d) 984 (C.C.A. 2d 1924).
9 Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 2o6 U.S. 230 (9o7); Babcock v. New Jersey Stock
Yard Co., 20 N.J. Eq. 296 (i869); Collins v. Wayne Iron Co., 227 Pa. 326, 76 Ati. 24 (IgIO).
10 Stetson v. Stetson, 14 F. Supp. 74 (N.Y. 1936); John H. Woodbury, Inc. v. William A.
Woodbury Corp., 23 F. Supp. 162 (N.Y. 1938), motion to modify decree denied in 23 F. Supp.
768 (N.Y. 1938). Where hardship ensues the court may modify injunctions upon a petition
stating a change in conditions even though no jurisdiction has been expressly retained. Ladner
v. Seigal, 298 Pa. 487, 148 Atl. 699 (i93o). For a collection of cases see 68 A.L.R. 1182 (1930).
"r P. 802. See also Charles E. Hires Co. v. Consumers Co., zoo Fed. 8og (C.C.A. 7th igoo);
Williams v. Mitchell, io6 Fed. 168 (C.C.A. 7 th igoi); Sterling Remedy Co. v. Spermine
Medical Co., 112 Fed. iooo (C.C.A. 7 th igoi); Vick Medicine Co. v. Vick Chemical Co.,
ix F. (2d) 33 (C.C.A. 5 th 1926); De Nobili Cigar Co. v. Nobile Cigar Co., 56 F. (2d) 324
(C.C.A. Ist 1932).
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developed in suits for patent infringement" and unfair competition.13 Here, prior to
the issuance of an injunction, the defendant is permitted to present a new device for a
determination by the court as to whether such device would violate the proposed in-
junction. It appears that this procedure has been also available after the entry of
a decree and during the pendency of an appeal.14 It is suggested that this practice
should be more widely accepted since there is to date no adequate method for inter-
preting final decrees at the instance of the defendant.'s
The court in the instant case dismissed the petitioner's supplementary bill on the
additional ground that the defendant was seeking an advisory opinion. Such a view
would preclude the entertaining of a similar complaint presented in an independent pro-
ceeding because of the constitutional clause limiting the jurisdiction of the federal judi-
ciary to "cases or controversies." 6 It is submitted that the court's position is unsound
in this regard and that the situation presented is subject to adjudication under the
Federal Declaratory judgment Act.7 The declaratory judgment, in effect "an ex-
panded bill quia tirnet,"'8 has been held proper even before the stage for coercive relief
has been reached,9 where a person seeks a determination that he is privileged to pursue
a specified course of conduct without subjecting himself to a suit for damages or other
forms of liability.2" Thus a declaratory judgment was held proper where the plaintiff
sought an adjudication that it was privileged to build on certain property and that
its proposed construction would not violate certain covenants." Such relief was like-
wise granted where the plaintiff as life tenant by virtue of a devise brought an action to
determine whether he was entitled to demolish a private dwelling and build an apart-
ment house in its stead without being liable for waste. 2 In Woodward v. Fox West
Coast Theaters'3 a lessee was permitted to maintain an action for a declaratory judg-
"Kalamazoo Loose-Leaf Binder Co. v. Proudfit Loose-Leaf Co., 243 Fed. 895 (C.C.A. 6th
1917); Cincinnati v. New York Rapid Transit Corporation, 52 F. (2d) 44 (C.C.A. 2d 1931).
13 Coca-Cola Co. v. Gay-Ola Co., 211 Fed. 942 (C.C.A. 6th x914).
140. & W. Thum Co. v. A. K. Ackerman Co., 257 Fed. 394 (C.C.A. 6th g9ig).
's For cases where the plaintiff is granted supplemental relief after decree is entered see
Armstrong v. De Forest Radio Telephone & Telegraph Co., io F.(2d) 727 (C.C.A. 2d i926);
Sundh Electric Co. v. General Electric Co., 217 Fed. 583 (D.C. N.Y. 1914). See also Hartford-
Empire Co. v. Obear-Nester Glass Co., 95 F.(2d) 414 (C.C.A. 8th 1938); cf. Prang Co. v.
American Crayon Co., 58 F.(2d) 715 (C.C.A. 3d 1932).
16 U.S. Const. art. 3, § 2.
' 748 Stat. 955 (1934), 28 U.S.C.A. § 400 (Supp. 1938).
IS See Meeker v. Baxter, 83 F. (2d) 183, 187 (C.C.A. 2d 1936); Han v. Venetian Blind
Corporation, iS F. Supp. 372, 375 (Cal. 1936).
'9 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937).
2 "Borchard, Justiciability, 4 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. i (1936); Borchard, Judicial Relief for
Peril and Insecurity, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 793 (1932); Schroth, The "Actual Controversy" in
Declaratory Actions, 20 Corn. L. Q. i (1934).
21 Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Sahlem, 254 N.Y. i61, 172 N.E. 455 (r93o); see also
Brown v. Levin, 295 Pa. 530, 145 AUl. 593 (1929); Bristol v. Woodward, 251 N.Y. 275, 167N.E. 441 (1929).
"Brokaw v. Fairchild, 135 Misc. 70, 237 N.Y. Supp. 6 (1929).
23 36 Ariz. 251, 284 Pac. 350 (1930). See also Kariher's Petition, 284 Pa. 455, 131 Al. 265
(1925).
RECENT CASES
ment as to the validity of its lease with the defendant city prior to its making extensive
improvements then contemplated. Similarly declaratory relief has been granted to
determine the construction to be placed on a long term lease,24 to ascertain the rights
of a party under a contract which had been cancelled as between other parties to it,s
to establish the validity of a contract of sale,26 and to determine in a suit by the insured
whether an insurance policy was still in effect.27 A like remedy should be available in
the instant case, where a party is bound by obligations imposed by an equitable decree
rather than by a contract, deed, or will.
Certain objections may conceivably be made to the practice suggested. To a
charge that unfair competition would be encouraged, the reply is that the Federal
Declaratory Judgment Act authorizes the application of a new remedy but in no way
alters the substantive law.28 Nor would a suit for a declaration of rights unduly burden
the defending party with litigation. The broad powers of the federal courts to impose
costs will serve to obviate this objection.29 Furthermore, the granting of declaratory
relief rests upon the sound discretion of the court.3o There seems, therefore, to be no
valid objection to the use of a declaratory judgment as a device for interpreting
equitable decreesa3 at least when such action is brought in the court which issued such
decree.
Labor Law-Jurisdiction of National Labor Relations Board-Scope of Interstate
Commerce-[Federal].-The respondent, prior to the establishment of his present
business, was employed as general supervisor of the L company, a partnership com-
posed of his sons. Subsequent to a labor dispute in the partnership plant, he left his
employment and moved to another state to establish his present business, the neces-
sary capital having been advanced to him as a loan by the L company. The respondent
operated under a standard agreement whereby he performed finishing operations ex-
clusively for the L company, which in return supplied raw materials to no other
finisher. As soon as the processing was completed, the finished goods were turned over
to a representative of the L company, who assumed responsibility for their out-of-state
shipment. The National Labor Relations Board found that the respondent was en-
gaged in unfair labor practices,' and on petition to the circuit court of appeals to en-
force the Board's cease and desist order, held (one judge dissenting), that the Board
24Washinton-Detroit Theatre Co. v. Moore, 249 Mich. 673, 229 N.W. 618 (1930). See
also Sarner v. Kantor, 123 Misc. 469, 2o5 N.Y. Supp. 76o (1924).
2S Gotham Amusement Corp. v. Glover, i N.Y.S. (2d) 712 (i937).
26 Petroleum Exploration, Inc. v. Superior Oil Corp., 232 Ky. 625, 24 S.W. (2d) 259 (1930).
27 Stephenson v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc., 92 F. (2d) 4o6 (C.C.A. 4 th '937). See
Anderson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 89 F. (2d) 345 (C.C.A. 4 th 1937).
28 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937); Davis v. American Foundry
Equipment Co., 94 F. (2d) 44r, 442 (C.C.A. 7th x938).
29 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 54(d).
30 Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Quarles, 92 F. (2d) 321 (C.C.A. 4 th 1937); New York
Life Ins. Co. v. Roe, 22 F. Supp. iooo (Ark. 1938).
3' See Beach v. Beach, 57 Ohio App. 274, 13 N.E. (2d) 58i (1937).
'I N. L. R. B. 864 (1936); 4 N. L. R. B. 596 (1937).
